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1. Introduction
Since the recent dramatic rise of unemployment levels in Europe, and the
comparatively high level of employment growth achieved in Japan and in the
U.S., increasing emphasis has been placed upon the 'inflexibility' of European
labour markets. The observation that a market is 'inflexible' may not, of
course, be a useful indicator of its efficiency, but we can be confident that
inflexibilities arising as an unanticipated consequence of government policies
reflect efficiency losses and not optimizing behaviour. Our purpose in this
paper is to consider one such welfare-reducing barrier to efficient labour
mobility.
British policy-makers have intervened extensively in the housing market
since the turn of the century in ways which appear likely to influence the
functioning of the labour market. Unfortunately, these influences were almost
entirely unintended side-effects of housing policies, rather than the second-
best consequences of a unified view of the likely outcomes for both markets.
While the cost of this myopic approach can be mis-stated and exaggerated, it
remains an outstanding example of the need to consider the ramifications of
policy beyond the market which is directly affected. The purpose of this essay
willbe to draw together our understanding of these spillovers paying
particular attention to any implications for macro-economic modeling of
labour markets. In keeping with this objective, and in order to address
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questions concerning labour market flexibility, we shall distinguish the
following indicators by which economists might view flexibility to have been
influenced by a micro policy or market structure.
The nature of the short-run wage/employment response to an aggregate
demand shock, and the period of time required to adjust to the long-run
equilibrium.
The short and long run response to a change either in the composition
of demand or a 'supply shock'.
The value of the equilibrium (NAIRU) rate of unemployment and its
regional distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss how
housing market policies have affected inter-regional migration and, since our
ultimate concern is largely with unemployment, the relationship between
unemployment and migration. This theme is extended insection 3 by
examining the links between job mobility and housing movement in order to
establish the importance of the apparent constraints imposed by the U.K.
housing system on labour mobility. In section 4 we discuss how this evidence
may be of value in understanding the patterns of inflexibility and unemploy-
ment that is observed in the U.K. Section 5 concludes the paper with a
discussion of policies which might ameliorate the worst side-effects of U.K.
housing policies.
2. Housing and unemployment: Implications for geographic mobility
The implications of housing market policies for geographic labour mobility
can be largely explained in terms of the consequences of these policies for the
pattern of house tenure in the U.K. Three major policies have influenced the
evolution of house tenure patterns in the U.K.: that of constructing and
retaining in public ownership a large amount of primarily blue-collar rental
accommodation (council housing); the application of rent controls to large
proportions of the private sector; and tax relief on loans to house-purchasers.
These policies have all served to squeeze the private rental sector, so that,
whereas seventy years ago about 90% of households lived in private rental
accommodation, less than l2% presently do so. About 28% of British
households live in publicly owned accommodation and over 60% are owner-
occupiers.
The dramatic contraction of the size of the private rental sector and the
remaining excess demand for its services have almost totally undermined that
sector's familiar function of supplying short-term housing for migrants into
an area. This has amplified the weaknesses in the operation of the council
housing system which itself discourages migration by its tenants. Having
little access to private rental housing, council tenants wishing to migrate whoG. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 85
are unable or unwilling to purchase a dwelling must obtain council housing
in their destination region. To locate suitable accommodation council tenants
are expected to rely upon council house exchanges/transfers; if there are
unequal number of households seeking to enter and leave anarea some
workers willbe 'rationed' out of an exchange. Such an imbalance is
inevitable given the asymmetry of the U.K. labour market: the largest stocks
of council housing are located in regions of high unemployment, from where
workers are likely to want to migrate.
There are, therefore, clear arguments as to why the linkage between tenure
and migration is likely to be quite different in the U.K. from that in the U.S.
The large majority of rental tenants are likely to find the costs of migration
both greater and more uncertain than is normally associated with the rental
market. However, the tenure-migration linkage is complicated by the simul-
taneous influence of migration plans on tenure choice. We believe this to be
unimportant in the U.K. for all but relatively few households; the following
simple model explains the basis for this view.
Assume that individuals reside in one of three tenures: owner-occupation
(00), unfurnished rental (UR)- which isrent-controlled and includes
council housing (CH)- and furnished rental (FR), whichisnot fully
controlled. Initially, let us assume that households do not intend to migrate.
There is rationing of both 00 housing- in the sense that households may
not borrow freely at going interest rates - and UR housing. Empirically it is
also reasonable to assume that in the absence of rationing, all households
will choose to occupy either 00 or UR housing, with the choice between
these tenures depending upon rents, interest rates and household character-
istics. FR accommodation would then only be occupied by households
rationed out of one or both of the primary tenures.
Now, suppose that some households take account of the gains from
migration net of the costs of moving house when choosing tenure. Moving
into or out of a dwelling in the rental sector is relatively inexpensive, but
movement into or out of 00 housing is relatively expensive. Thus,any
household that in the absence of migration opportunities would enter 00
might in the presence of such opportunities decide not to doso prior to
migrating; conversely a household ,that in the absence of migration opportun-
ities would move out of 00 would not be (much) affected by migration
possibilities. Tenants in FR considering moving into 00 would have to
balance the financial savings from changing tenure against the additional
expected costs of migrating from 00. Likewise tenants in UR who because
of changed personal circumstances now prefer 00 must balance the utility
so gained against the higher cost of migration from 00. Still, the importance
of this influence is substantially attenuated by (i) the considerable financial
incentives to move from FR to 00 and (ii) the small number ofmoves from
UR to 00.86 G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
To capture the effect of (i) in a simple manner we may suppose that the
intention to migrate will only discourage a household's move from FR to
00 if it intends to migrate within h months. The value of h will increase
with (a) the costs of buying and selling 00 houses, and (b) the expected
relative price of 00 housing services relative to FR housing services. Our
estimates yielded values of h in the range 12-14 months for most households
in the early 1970s and the relative movements of rents, interest rates and
house prices during the subsequent decade tended to reduce rather than
increase the value of h. As a comparison Shelton (1968) suggested that h was
of the order of 3years in his analysis of the comparative costs of owner-
occupation and rental in the United States. Thus, while we are not entirely
justified in treating tenure as an exogenous variable in our estimates, it
would appear that the existence of rationing, together with the financial
advantages of owner-occupation and unfurnished rental vis-a-vis furnished
rental, will greatly limit the influence of migration plans on the choice of
household tenure prior to migration.
This analysis suggests that, as a result of ignoring this selection bias, 00
should be found to be associated with less migration, and both FR and UR
with more migration, than would be the case if the bias was removed. Thus,
comparisons made below between council tenancy and owner-occupation
may, if anything, overstate the migration rates of council and private tenants
relative to those of owner-occupiers.
2.1. Evidence
The definitions of mobility used in the evidence discussed here are largely
determined by the data sets which collect sufficient information about
current and past circumstances to perform the necessary estimations. For
Britain we rely upon the General Household Survey (GHS) for 1973 and
1974 and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 1983 which are made available
to researchers with individuals identifiable only in terms of the following
regions: North, North-West, Yorks/Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands,
East Anglia, Greater London, South-East, South-West, Wales, Scotland -
Northern Ireland is not covered by the GHS and has been excluded from
our analysis of the LFS data. We shall describe a migrating household as one
in which the current address is in a different region to that one year
previously. Unfortunately, the LFS does not distinguish between Greater
London and the rest of the South East in recording the previous residence of
the household, so that in some of the tables our definition of migration
excludes moves between these two (sub)regions. In such cases comparisons
with the GHS data have been performed on a consistent basis. A moving
household is one moving house in the past year to any destination. For
comparative purposes we have used data from the family data tape of theG. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 87
Michigan Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1980. The nature of
this data means that our figures will refer to migration/movement rates for
heads of households who are members of the labour force. For Britaingross
migration/movement rates for workers who are not heads of householdsare
very similar to those for heads of households, so little seems to be lost as a
result of this restriction. In order to limit the impact of migration/movement
associated with the beginning and end of working liveswe have restricted
our attention to those aged between 21 and 64 years.
It is often conjectured that British workers are less likely than workers in
other countries to migrate between regions, so it is interesting to beginour
empirical analysis with some basic statistics concerning this point. Weare
not aware of any detailed comparative study of this proposition basedupon
cross-section data and, in any case, comparisons between geographically
different countries are not easy to make. In table 1 we give migration and
movement rates calculated from our three datasets for all heads of households,
for 'young' (age <35) heads of households, and for heads of households
split between those engaged in non-manual and manual occupations. In
the case of the GHS data for the U.K. and the PSID data for the U.S. it is
possible to distinguish between those who reported that they migrated/moved
for job-related reasons and those migrating/moving for otherreasons. The U.K.
figureson migration exclude moves between London and the South
East. We regard inter-state migration in the U.S.as providing the most
appropriate comparison for inter-regional migration in the U.K., since the
numbers of geographical units relative to population are similar withsome
being large in population and/or area and some quite small. It is also
interesting to compare moves acrossa county line with all movement in the
U.S., since inter-county movement is the closest approximation tomoves
from one local authority district to another in the U.K. for which data is
not available.
The table shows that movement and migration rates are much lower in the
U.K. than in the U.S. Even when we use whichever is largest of the figures
for the two British datasets, gross movement and migration rates in the U.S.
are between two and three times those in the U.K. For job-related migration
the ratio lies in the same range but the job-related movement rate in the U.S.
is over 3.5 times that in the U.K. The pattern of the movement and
migration rates for young heads of households in the two countries is similar
to that for all heads of households but with somewhat higher U.K. migration
rates relative to U.S. rates, especially for job-related reasons. In the U.S. the
rates of movement across a county line for both young and all heads of
households are typically twice the corresponding migration rates. Thus,
about one-half of 'non-local' moves, most of which involvea shift from one
local labour market area to another, take the form of longer distance
migration, but in total these represent only about one-quarter of all changes
in residence.88 G.Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
Table I
Migration and movement rates for the U.K. and the U.S. (percent of heads of households
in the labour force).
Movement/migration rates (%)
Sources: UK - General household surveys 1973, 1974 and Labour force survey 1983.
US - Michigan panel survey of income dynamics family tape 1980.
The most striking feature of the figures in table1concerns the great
difference between the ratios of U.S to U.K. migration rates for non-manual
and manual heads of households. For non-manual workers the U.S. migra-
tion rate is only 46% higher than the U.K. rate and when we focus on job-
related migration the U.S. rate is less than the U.K. rate. On the other hand,
for manual workers the U.S. rate for all migration is over 5.7 times the U.K.
rate while for job-related migration this ratio is18, largely because the
British rate is so low. In the U.S. both all and job-related migration rates are
substantially higher for manual than for non-manual workers, but in the
U.K. thipattern is reversed with much higher migration rates for non-
manual than for manual workers. Note also that in the U.S. the proportional






(A)UK - General Household Survey1973-74
Movement
All 7.74 17.42 9.30 6.57
Job-related 0.99 2.12 1.80 0.39
Migration between regions
All 1.14 2.52 1.83 0.62
Job-related 0.45 1.12 0.93 0.10
(B)UK - Labour Force Survey1983
Movement 11.65 19.02 12.57 10.62
Migration between regions 1.01 1.87 1.35 0.62
(C) US -Panel Survey of Income Dynamics1980
Movement
All 26.03 4194 26.62 25.37
Job-related 3.52 6.05 2.68 4.44
Movement across a county line
All 6.55 1l.8 5.96 7.21
Job-related 1.84 3.33 1.16 2.60
Migration across a state line
All 3.09 5.56 2.67 3.56
Job-related 1.16 2.12 0.59 1.80G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 89
for job-related migration/movement than for all migration/movement.These
figures provide quite strong prima facie evidence for the view thatcouncil
housing has an important effect in reducing migrationrates in the U.K.,
since it is the major institutional difference between thetwo countries which
is specific to manual workers as few British non-manual workersare council
tenants.
In order to identify the influence of counciltenancy on regional migration
and house movement, we have used individual data from the1973-74 GHS
to examine both migration intentions and actual migration behaviour- see
Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1985). We found that migrationrates for
owner-occupiers are, ceteris paribus, approximately 4 times higherthan for
council tenants, even though differences in transactions costs would leadone
to expect higher migration rates for tenants than for owner-occupiers. Of the
3658 heads of household in the 1973 GHS who had been counciltenants one
year earlier, only 7 had an address in a different region in the followingyear,
and 5 of these had been living in Greater London. Whereas counciltenants
outside London comprised 30% of household heads in 1973 theyprovided
only about 3% of total migrants. Owner-occupiers comprisedabout 55% of
household heads outside London while 53% of the migrantswere owner-
occupiers.
One possible objection to this finding is that counciltenants are a self-
selected group who are less likely to moveeven after factors such as age,
education, industry, occupation and region are allowed for. It isnoteworthy
therefore that when total house movement is studied, makingno distinction
according to whether a regional boundary is crossed, counciltenants have a
movement rate which is about 60% higher, ceteris paribus, than forowner-
occupiers. Thus, within local areas the council exchangesystem seems to
work well. It is perhaps even more interesting that if intendedmigration is
studied, council tenants are no less likely than owner-occupiersto wish to
migrate, merely less successful in fulfilling their intentions. Thedifficulties
arise where house exchanges are sought between labour marketareas so that
(a) the cost of collecting information may be high, and (b) theremay be a
substantial imbalance in the numbers of intendedmovers in each direction.
Figures which illustrate the separate importance of tenureas an influence
upon migration rates are given in table 2. The diagonal elements in the table
give the predicted average migration rate for households in eachtenure
category. The off-diagonal elements give the predictedaverage migration
rates on the assumption thatthe households which have non-housing
characteristics of those in the column tenure category behaveas if they were
in the row tenure category. Thus, the average migrationrates of council
tenants in column 2 are predicted to increase from 1.0 to 3.9per 1000 should
they become owner-occupiers. Itisparticularly striking to compare the
figures in row 2 of the table with those in rows 3 and 4,as these highlight90 G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
Table 2
The impact of tenure on migration rates in the U.K.
aThjs table is read by considering a sample of households with non-housing character-
istics similar to those in the column tenure category and then imagining that these
households move between house tenure categories.
Source:Calculated using migration equations from Hughes and McCormick (1985)
and households in 1974 GHS.
the differences between the three tenancy categories in their effect on the
migration rates of specific populations. In all cases furnished tenancy implies
a migration rate over 10 times as large as that for council tenancy, while the
rate for unfurnished tenancy is over 6 times that for council tenancy. Since
unfurnished private tenants benefit from low controlled rents and have
security of tenure, it cannot merely be the availability of rent subsidies which
leadstothe low migrationratesforcouncil tenancy. Note alsothat
migration rates for owners are low by comparison with those for private
tenants. This is further confirmation that it is the nature of council tenancy
which depresses migration, since the relative migration rates of owners and
private tenants correspond to the pattern of their relative movement rates
and to what one would expect on a priori grounds given the relative
transactions costs for each tenure.
We can use the results of these studies to examine how far the difference
between U.K. and U.S. rates of (a) migration and (b) house movement can
be explained by the U.K. house tenure system. To do this we will examine
predicted U.K. migration rates on the assumption that the aggregate tenure
pattern is similar to that in the U.S. while holding the tenure influence on
migration constant. The tenure composition of U.S. households is approxi-
mately: 65% owner-occupiers, 32% private tenants and 4% tenants in public
housing, whereas for our U.K. 1973-74 sample the composition was: 53.5%
owner-occupiers, 31.5% council tenants, 7.5% private furnished tenants and
7.5% private unfurnished tenants. Thus, our experiment involves a hypo-
thetical redistribution of households out of public housing (council tenancy)
Predicted migration rates per 1000




Alternative Ownerstenants tenants tenants
Tenure (1) (2) (3) (4)
(I) Owners 9.4 3.9 16.7 6.7
(2) Council tenants 2.5 1.0 4.5 1.8
(3) Furnished tenants 35.8 15.8 60.2 25.8
(4) Unfurnished private tenants 17.0 7.2 29.7 12.2G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 91
to owner-occupation and private tenancy in order to match the U.S. tenure
pattern. This has been done by assuming that, randomly, 36% of council
tenants become owner-occupiers, and 26% each become private unfurnished
and furnished tenants - this latter split replicates the division of U.K. private
tenants between furnished and unfurnished accommodation since we have no
comparable data for the U.S.
The impactofthis change may be seen by comparing the first two rows of
table 3. Despite the apparently large dampening effect of tenure on migration
this hypothetical switch from council tenancy (which has the lowest migra-
tion ratesofall four tenures) to other tenures increases overall predicted
migration rates by less than one-quarter. The effect is even less for young
workers than for all workers since a smaller proportion of them are council
tenants. The principal reason for the relatively small impactofthis tenure
redistribution is that the other socio-economic characteristicsofthe popula-
tion of council tenants, who are predominantly manual workers with few
educational qualifications and are older on average than the whole popula-
tion, mean their migration and movement rates are low relative to those for
households in other tenure categories even after controlling for the influence
of tenure. This point may be understood by comparing the figures in column
2 of table 2 with the other columns.
Another major difference between the two countries lies in the proportion
Table 3
The impact of U.S. tenure/education patterns on U.K. migration/movement rates
Predicted migration/movement rates
per 1000 households for
Households with head aged <35 years.
bBased on assumption that the tenure pattern is:owners 65%, council tenants 3%, private
tenants 32% (of which 51% are unfurnished).
cBased on assumption that 23% of heads of households have a higher educational qualific-
ation instead of 8%.
Source:Calculating using migration/movement equations from Hughes and McCormick
(1985) and households in 1974.
All workers Young workers
Migration MovementMigration Movement
(I) U.K. population characteristics 10.6 56.6 21.8 121.8
(2) Adjusting for U.S. tenure patternb 12.7 69.2 25.5 141.9
(3) Adjusting for U.S. college
education patternc 12.5 66.5 26.0 145.0
(4) Adjusting for both U.S. tenure
and college education patterns 14.7 79.3 29.8 165.692 G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
of the population who have attended college or have undertaken some
equivalent form of higher education or training. This is important because
our analysis of migration behaviour suggests that households whose heads
have acquired some kind of higher educational qualificationare, ceteris
paribus, more likely to migrate than are those without sucha qualification.
There are obvious difficultiesin calculating comparable figuresforthe
proportion of households in each country headed by someone witha higher
educational qualification because of the very different character and tra-
ditions of the educational and professional training systems in the two
countries. However, on a crude basithe 1981 U.K. Census figures show that
7.9% of males aged 25 or more have a degree or an equivalent professional
qualification, while 23% of males in the same age group in the 1980 U.S.
Census had completed 4 years of college education.
In this case the comparison with the U.S. is carried out by assuming that
all of those heads of household with 'A' levels or similar qualifications
(equivalent to the baccalaureat or abitur in Europe) have a college education
as also do 45% of those with '0' levels (the public examination taken at age
16). The impact of these educational changes in our hypothetical population
on migration/movement rates is shown in the third row of table 3. It is quite
similar to that of the changes in the tenure pattern, slightly larger for young
workers, who are better educated already than the average, and slightly
lower for the whole population.
Putting the joint effects of tenure and college education together yields the
final row of table 3. This gives predicted migration rates which are about
38% higher than for current tenure and educational patterns. It follows that,
after allowing for these two major differences between the U.K. and the U.S.,
British inter-regional migration rates are still only one-half the level of the
American inter-state migration rate for comparable households. For all
house movement - which, given the difficulty of making geographic com-
parisons, is a less ambiguous measure of comparative mobility rates- the
impact of the combined tenure and educational changes is very similar to
that for migration - an increase of 40% for all workers- which might raise
the predicted U.K. rate of house movement to 16.3% p.a. if we use the 1983
LFS figures as our base. This is much lower than the comparable U.S. rate
of 26% p.a., so that much of the difference between the two countries in both
migration and movement rates remains unexplained.
Since our ultimate concern in this paper is with labour market flexibility
and unemployment, we will now outline what is known about whether
unemployment in the U.K. is a stimulant to migration between geographic
labour markets. Interestingly, the two basic findings here are broadly similar
to those for the U.S. - see DaVanzo (1978). Our investigations of U.K.
migration (Hughes and McCormick, 1981, 1985) have shown that
(a)living in a high unemployment rate region does not exercise theG. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 93
expected positive effect on actual or planned migration (and there is some
evidence of a negative effect),
(b)an unemployed individual is more likely to plan to migrate (U.K.) and
to actually migrate (U.S.).
An important qualification should be made to the U.K. finding concerning
the migration behaviour of unemployed individuals: while there is clear
evidence that being unemployed increases the intended migration rates of
non-manual workers, we have been unable to detect any influence upon the
intended migration rates of manual workers. Thus, if council housing has all
but ended migration for the representative manual worker, there appears to
be no need to qualify this for the unemployed. In a two region model of the
U.K., with two types of labour, one could realistically treat one type of
labour as immobile for the purposes of macro-economic analysis. This is not
torule out the possibility that depressed regions experience net total
outflows of labour - probably primarily because the depressed conditions
deter immigration of non-manuals rather than by encouraging emigration.
Table 4 draws upon the 1983 Labour Force Survey to illustrate the pattern
of recent inter-regional labour flows and their relationship to unemploy-
ment rates. The distinction between manual and non-manual workers is
crucial because of the completely different unemployment situation for
the two groups. Unemployment rates are low and vary little across regions
for non-manual workers whereas they are much higher and show a high
Table 4
Regional composition of unemployment and migration in the U.K.
% Composition by region of HOHs who are













North 4.7 17.5 4.7 6.5 6.0 4.8 4.5 6.0
Yorks,/Humber 5.0 14.6 8.4 10.1 10.2 9.5 9.9 7.1
North West 5.5 17.7 10.6 11.7 9.0 6.6 10.5 8.9
East Midlands 3.2 9.6 6.7 8.0 12.4 11.9 8.1 11.3
West Midlands 5.5 17.3 8.4 10.9 6.9 7.7 11.1 9.5















South West 3.8 9.6 8.3 8.0 16.6 17.3 10.8 10.7
Wales 3.8 17.1 4.0 5.3 2.4 5.4 6.0 4.8
Scotland 4.1 15.1 9.1 9.6 4.5 6.6 5.4 4.2
Total sample 2163325856 332 168 332 16894 G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
degree of regional variation for manual workers. Migration rates - which,
as explained above, exclude moves between London and the South East in
this source - are low for both groups but the non-manual rate of 1.5% is
over twice the manual rate of 0.65%. There is no significant relationship
between net migration and unemployment rates for either group. London and
the South East together experienced net out-migration of both non-manual
and manual workers - especially the latter - despite relatively low unemploy-
ment rates while regions such as Yorks/Humber, Wales and Scotland
experienced a net inflow of manual workers despite relatively high unemploy-
ment rates. The major systematic patterns seem to be
the movement of both manual and non-manual households to the South
West (Britain's sunbelt!),
an eastward movement out of the North West and the West Midlands
to Yorks/Humber, East Midlands and - for manual workers - East Anglia.
3. Job mobility and house movement
The evidence presented in the previous section indicates that the restraints
on migration associated with British council housing tend to reduce the
overall level of migration by a significant amount, though this does not
account for the large difference between British and American aggregate
migration rates. However, this does not demonstrate conclusively that
barriers to housing mobility inhibit job flexibility, since it is possible that
potential job changers are more successful than other council tenants in
achieving council house transfers - either because they are more persistent or
because theyaretreated more favourably by localauthority housing
administrators. To investigate this point and related issues concerning the
link between housing and labour mobility we have estimated a number of
models.
The principal work to be discussed here examines the effect of house
tenure on the probability that a household will migrate/move for job-related
reasons. This analysis may be carried out by estimating logit equations for
the probabilities that a household actually migrated/moved (past migration/
movement) or is seeking to do so (potential migration/movement) for job-
related reasons on two bases
comparing these households with all other households,
comparing these households with other households which migrated/
moved or are seeking to migrate/move for any reason.
In all cases the identification of a household as a past/potential migrant/mover
for job-related reasons is based on a question which asked all actual/potential
movers to specify their primary reason for moving from a list of possible
responses. Apart from job-related reasons, which comprised a single responseG. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment 95
category, the other reasons given were (in PSID parlance) consumption
reasons, i.e.,to obtain better/different housing, or family reasons, i.e.,to
move closer to relatives.
The coefficients on housing tenure in logit equations for these two sets of
probabilities are given in table 5. As well as tenure categories the equations
included dummy variables for socio-economic groups, for educational qualif-
ications, for employment in the service sector, for living ina depressed
region, for not being married and for having an occupational pension. Age,
age squared and length of residence in the household's current/previous
home werethecontinuousindependentvariables.Theseindependent
variables were included on a priori grounds as a result of Our previous work
on housing movement and on job mobility. We have made no attempt to
obtain the most parsimonious model in each case since the role of the non-
tenure variables in this context is to control for the influence of extraneous
factors which may be correlated with tenure. For allof the equations
reported in this paper the sample consists of heads of households whoare
Table 5
Tenure coefficients in logit equations for job-related movement/rnigration.a
See text for details of other variables included in the equations. The figures in
brackets are the asymptotic t-ratios of the coefficients. Owner-occupiers are the
control tenure category.
Source:Estimated from GHS 1973/74 data.
Migration Movement
Potential ActualPotential Actual
(A) Job-related migration/movement for all households
Council tenant 0.00 0.9!0.10 0.87
(0.00) (1.67) (0.52) (0.82)
Furnished tenant 0.37 1.50 1.04 1.54
(1.04) (5.01) (5.91) (3.45)
Private unfurnished tenant 1.05 0.69 0.31 1.40
(3.09) (1.71) (1.26) (2.73
(B) job-related migration/movement conditional upon migration/movement
Council tenant 0.63 0.670.66 - 1.60
(1.63) (0.36) (3.39) (2.81)
Furnished tenant 0.44 0.10 0.21 0.26
(1.01) (0.14) (1.13) (0.72)
Private unfurnished tenant 0.48 1.820.60 0.61
(1.04) (1.73) (2.32) (1.37)
No of positive responses 97 38 282 77
Sample size: A 7239 8067 15120 8067
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members of the labour force. In analysing migration/movement we are
interested in labour force behaviour so that moves as a result of marriage,
marital breakdown, etc. are excluded by restricting the sample to households
with the same head before and after a previous move or in which the head of
household was thinking of moving.
Section A of table 5 provides estimates of the coefficients on tenure in logit
equations for the probability that a household migrated/moved for job-
related reasons in the past year or is considering migrating/moving for
similar reasons. In this case the sample consists of all households satisfying
the criteria specified above. The default tenure category is owner-occupation
so that the coefficients in the table reflect differences between the influence of
the tenure concerned and owner-occupation on the probability investigated.
Section B of the table gives the tenure coefficients in logit equations for the
probability of past/potential migration/movement for job-related reasons
conditional on migration/movement. In other words, column 1 of section B is
estimated from a sample of households who were considering migration for
any reason and the coefficients relate to the probability that households
among this group were considering movement for job-related rather than
other reasons. Similarly, column 2 of this section of the table is extracted
from the equation for the probability that a household which migrated in the
previous year did so for job-related rather than other reasons, while columns
3 and 4 provide the same coefficients for the probabilities of job-related
movement conditional on movement.
In effect section A replicates our earlier work except that the focus is on
migration/movement for job-related rather than for all reasons. The first
column confirms that council tenants are as likely as owner-occupiers to seek
to migrate for job-related reasons, while the second column shows that they
are muchlesslikelyactuallyto migrate for job-relatedreasons. The
coefficient on council tenancy is significantly less than zero on a one-tailed
test, but the level of significance is low because of the very small total
number of actual migrants for job-related reasons. Thus, the relative absence
of job-related migrants from council tenancy, which is the source of the
negative coefficient,isless significant in a statistical sense than in our
previous study. In view of the results of our previous work we believe that
these results reinforce the general conclusion that council tenants experience
much greaterdifficulty than owner-occupiers inactuallyfulfillingtheir
migration intentions for job-related as well as for other reasons. This is not true
for tenants in general since both furnished and private unfurnished tenants
are more likely to migrate for job-related reasons than are owner-occupiers.
With respect to house movement, our previous investigations showed that,
ceteris paribus, council tenants were more likely to move than were owner-
occupiers which conforms with the predicted pattern given the differences in
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tenancy in column 4 impliesthatthis does not hold for job-related
movement, though council tenants are similar to owner-occupiers in the
probability that they are considering movement for job-related reasons. This
means that the higher rate of house movement, ceteris paribus, among
council tenants is associated with moves to better or more suitable ac-
commodation rather than to more appropriate jobs. It seems, therefore, that
it is not only migration which is discouraged by council housing but all
forms of job-related movement. Again the contrast between council tenants
and other tenants is very marked since the coefficients on furnished and
private unfurnished tenancy in this equation are both significantly greater
than zero. Our explanation for this pattern is that moves for consumption
reasons tend to take place within a limited geographical area and, so long as
council tenants remain within the district covered by a single local housing
authority, council house exchanges or moves are quite easy to arrange. On
the other hand, a move for job-related reasons will typically involve a move
toa different local authoritydistrict and thuswill encounter similar
difficulties to those affecting migration over a longer distance.
Since the costs of moving for tenants are much lower than forowner-
occupiers, which comprise the default tenure group in the estimated equa-
tions, one would expect that tenants would be more prone to move for
non-job-related reasons than would owner-occupiers. This would imply
negative coefficients on the tenancy dummy variables in the equations for
job-related movement (or search) conditional on movement. However, there
is no inherent reason why movement should be more or less expensive fora
public tenant than for a private tenant, so that differences between the three
types of tenancy are likely to reflect the way in which these tenures are
restricted or controlled.
As expected there are significant negative coefficients on council tenancy
and private unfurnished tenancy in the logit equations (columns 3 and 4 of
table 5B) for job-related movement conditional on movement- both for
potential and past movement - though in this respect there is little difference
between owner-occupiers and furnished tenants. However, both types of
controlled tenants are more likely to have migrated in the past for job-
related reasons than are are owner-occupiers, which indicates the difficulty of
'casual' migration when there arerent or other controls affecting the
availability of rented housing. The small number of migrants in this equation
means that neither coefficientisstatisticallysignificant. The differences
between the coefficients for these two tenures, which one would expect to be
very similar in an unrestricted environment, are striking and they imply that
council tenants are systematically less likely to migrateor move for job-
related reasons than are private unfurnished tenants, though in thecase of
movement there islittle difference between them in their propensity to
search.98 G. Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
To provide quantitative indicators of the importance of these tenure effects
tables 6 and 7 follow tables 2 and 3 but with specific reference to job-related
migration and movement only. Since we are primarily interested in the
impact of council housing on job-related mobility table 6 focuses on the
predicted values of migration and movement rates per 1000 council tenants
either in their own tenure (column 2) or in the three alternative tenures - i.e.,
the rows in this table correspond to column 2 in table 2. In addition to
predicted mobility rates we have used the methods described in Hughes and
McCormick (1985) to calculate two measures of the likelihood that someone
who embarks on search to migrate/move will be successful. The first measure
(z1) is the probability that the search is successful within a fixed period and
the second measure (t,)is the length of time spent searching in order to
achieve a fixed probability of success. Both measures are calculated using the
Table 6
Differences between council housing and other tenures in job-related
migration/movement.
Predicted values per 1000 council tenants
in alternative tenure group°
Defined as z in Hughes and McCormick (1985).
bDefined as t. in Hughes and McCormick (1985).
°Figuresinbracketsaretheequivalentvaluesforall
migration/movement.














Migration 1.1 0.5 5.1 4.5
(3.9) (1.0) (15.8) (7.2)
Movement 4.3 1.8 18.7 8.6
(23.1) (39.9) (155.9) (91.3)
(B) Probabilities of Successful Search
Migration 16.3 6.8 52.3 23.2
(6.6) (1.9) (17.3) (7.6)
Movement 35.1 15.6 56.0 51.5
(17.3) (20.1) (61.8) (30.4)
(C) Relative Lengths ofSearchfor Uniform Successb
Migration 3.5 8.5 1.1 2.5
(11.8) (40.8) (4.5) (10.3)
Movement 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.6
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estimated equations for past migration/movement and for migration/move-
ment search. Higher values of the probability of successful search and lower
values of the relative length of search indicate that the tenure group finds it
lesscostly or encounters less barriers to fulfilling an intention to mig-
rate/move for job-related reasons.
The differences between council tenants and owner-occupiers in their
predicted rates of job-related migration are smaller than for all migration
sincethehypotheticalshift from council tenancy to owner-occupation
doubles the rate of job-related migration for council tenants whereas this
ratio is approximately 4 for all migration. The same is true for furnished
tenancy when compared with council tenants, whereas the difference between
unfurnished private tenants and council tenants is similar for job-related and
all migration. For job-related movement the pattern is dramatically different
because, as the figures for all migration/movement in brackets show, council
tenants have a predicted rate of all movement which is nearly twice that of
owner-occupierswhereasthisrelationshipisreversedforjob-related
movement.
In most cases the probability of success in fulfilling an intention to make a
job-related migration or movement is higher than for all migration/move-
ment - for migration by council tenants it is over three times higher - but
again for council tenants the probability of successful search for job-related
movement is lower than for all movement. The same is true for furnished
tenants though the success rates are both much higher and relatively closer
together.
With respect to our interest in labour market flexibility the figures in table
6 imply that households find it substantially easier to fulfil an intention to
migrate for job-related reasons than for other types of migration. The
difference between council tenants and other tenure groups with respect to
job-related migration rates is less than for all migration. On the other hand
council tenants seem to experience substantial difficulty in organising local
moves for job reasons. For example, the probability of successful search for
an owner-occupier who wants to move for job-related reasons is over double
the equivalent probability for a council tenant, whereas the probability of
successful search to move for all reasons is slightly higher for council tenants
than that for owner-occupiers. This is particularly notable in view of the
higher success rate of private unfurnished tenants for job-related moves
relative to all moves. Again this casts doubt on any simple interpretation of
the influence of council tenancy relying upon the effect of rent subsidies.
Turning to the aggregate impact of tenure and education on job-related
migration/movement the figures in table 7 show that the overall adjustments
to aggregate job-related migration/movement rates due to tenure and college
education differences between the U.K. and the U.S. are very similar to those
for all migration/movement. They are a little smaller for young workers and100 G.Hughes and B. McCormick, Housing markets and unemployment
Table 7
The impact of U.S. tenure/education patterns on U.K. job-related migration/movement.
Predicted migration/movement rates
per 1000 households for
aSee notes to table 2.
Source:Calculated using migration/movement equations in table 4 and households in
1974.
a little higher for movement by all workers, but the earlier conclusions about
differences between the U.K. and the U.S. apply equally to job-related
movement. For job-related migration, especially by young workers, the
proportional gap between the two countries is somewhat smaller than for all
migration, so that after the adjustments in table 7 have been applied the
hypothetical rate of job-related migration for young workers rises to about
70% of the U.S. rate.
To establish whether it is the labour market or the housing market which
imposes the binding constraint on household decisions involvestricky
problems of econometric modelling and, ideally, requires fuller data than we
have available at present. We have attempted to investigate this issue in
some incomplete work using techniques of simultaneous and recursive
bivariate probit analysis. Estimation of these models is very expensive with
large datasets and, unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain clear-cut
results concerning the nature of the link between decisions concerning job
mobility and house movement. Inferences which do appear to be valid are as
follows
For all households, housing search is conditioned upon job search, i.e.
the probability that a household will be observed searching for a new
residence is increased if the head of household is also tiinking of changing
his or her job, whereas the reverse is not the case.
For council tenants, past house movement and job changes appear to be
All workers All workers
MigrationMovement MigrationMovement
(1) U.K. population 4.8 9.6 10.6 20.8
characteristics
(2) Adjusting for U.S. 5.7 12.0 12.2 25.0
tenure pattern
(3) Adjusting for U.S. 5.7 11.1 12.5 24.2
college education pattern
(4) Adjusting for both U.S. 6.6 13.7 14.3 28.7
tenure and college
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independently determined, which is only possible if the job moves take place
within the household's local labour market area.
(c)For owner-occupiers, the direction of causality for past decisions is the
reverse of that for search. Thus, past house movement seems to increase the
probability of a job change but not vice-versa. This means that the housing
market may, in practice, be a constraint on labour market decisions made by
owner-occupiers as well as for council tenants.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the housing market does constrain
labour market flexibility,but the links involved are quite difficultto
disentangle.
4. Labour market flexibility and unemployment
In the previous section we summarized evidence concerning housing and
labour mobility in the U.K. In this section we examine how these relation-
ships might affect various measures of the flexibility of the labour market
and the pattern of unemployment.
4.1. Wage fixing and adjustment to demand shocks
Of the three parts of this section, our comments here are necessarily the
most speculative. Nevertheless, the potential implications of geographic
immobility for the nature of wage contracts deserve attention, and we shall
discuss three ideas. First, geographic immobility may have influenced the size
of the union sector. Second, game-theoretic analysis of wage determination in
the context of a declining industry, as recently discussed by Lawrence and
Lawrence (1985), is perhaps of heightened interest. Third, low migration rates
have increased the need for differential regional wage adjustment to remove
regional labour market imbalances, which may increase the difficulty of
coordinating a wage policy during a depression. We now consider these
points in turn.
To adopt Hirschman's terminology, trade unions provide a means for the
expression of 'voice' when an issue of concern to the workforce arises.
Workers may alternatively respond to the source of concern by seeking work
elsewhere - the 'exit' option. When mobility iscostly, workers have an
increased incentive to exercise the 'voice' option and to join and be active in
unions. Adopting a more traditional argument, where labour turnover is high
and substitute labour can easily move into the area, the difficulties confront-
ing a labour organiser are greater and, if a union is formed, it will have more
difficulty enforcing its preferences. Thus the high unionization rate in the
U.K. may partially reflect the factors contributing to geographic immobility,
particularly amongst manual workers. Furthermore, the choices of unions
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managementunion relations - the traditional explanation for low U.K.
productivity - may also reflect the costliness of exercising the 'exit' option for
many British workers. There is interesting work in this area by Freeman
(1980) who considers the effects of unions on workplace turnover, but further
empirical work unscrambling the related roles of geographic and workplace
turnover on which firms bargain with unions would appear to offer the
possibility of a richer understanding of the simultaneous determination of
both workplace turnover and the size of the union sector. This leads
naturally to our second point.
An interesting analysis of wage adjustment in the context of shocks to the
demand for labour is provided by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985). In this
model an adverse demand shock may push the firm into an optimal policy
regime in which investment is terminated. Because the capital stock is no
longer sensitive to the real wage, the elasticity of demand for labour declines.
This reduced elasticity may prompt the union to increase the wage in the
declining industry: the earnings of the firm, net of variable inputs, have
become pure rents that an attentive union may sequestrate in the drawn-out
decline of the firm. A policy which increases the costs of migrating between
regions reduces the elasticity of supply of the labour force. This increases the
incentive for the firm to engage in bargaining games to secure locational
rent, and while the analogy is not exact, increases the likelihood that models
of the sort studied by Lawrence and Lawrence offer an insight into how
wages and employment respond to a demand shock.
Third, geographic immobility increases the importance of regional wage
adjustment to clear markets, and the coordination of a deflationary wage
policy in the fact of a depression is made more difficult for labour contract
negotiators to reach if there exists an imbalance of excess supplies for labour
across regions. Such an imbalance may not prevent an appropriate nationally
agreed wage policy, but given that union representatives and firms will
experience different regional circumstances, it may (a) make its need more
difficult to perceive, and/or (b) increase the difficulty of achieving majority
support amongst the union or firms' representatives.
4.2. Adjustment to supply shocks and changes in the composition of demand
Both supply shocks and changes in the pattern of demand will generally
alter the equilibrium allocation of resources between regions. Barriers to
geographic mobility can be expected to increase the period of disequilibrium,
and perhaps alsothe nature of the eventual equilibrium. The higher
unemployment associated with any given pattern of shocks can be expected
to reduce aggregate demand because of either lower consumption or the
crowding outeffectof financing unemployment compensation, so that
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Thus, both directly and indirectly - through its effects on aggregate demand
- geographic immobility is likely to increase the amplitude of employment
cycles associated with these sorts of shocks.
Geographic immobility is also likely to increase the level of long-term
unemployment associated with a given pattern of shocks. This may facilitate
circumstances in which the NAIRU is likely to increase if the actual rate is
perturbed above its previous equilibrium. That is, the 'hysteresis' or path-
dependency effect may be particularly powerful in economies with geographic
immobility where the ability to reabsorb redundant workers into employ-
ment is considerably reducedsee Blanchard et al. (1985), Hargreaves-Heap
(1980).
Many of those becoming redundant following the recent U.K. shocks are
older workers, whose incentive to migrateisalready low, so thatthe
hysteresis effect is likely to be further reinforced. If there is a tendency for
seniority to be a less important criterion for deciding upon layoffs in Britain
and other European countries than itis in the U.S., then the resulting
consequences for the extent of long term unemployment and the force of the
hysteresis effect may be important. We believe that further analysis of the
effects of geographic immobility upon the tendency of workers to withdraw
from job search, and of the comparative lay-off behaviours of U.S. and
European firms, would be of particular value.
There is a further issue, connected with the hysteresis argument, which is
relevant for the U.K. We suggested in section 2 that the evidence that labour
flows out of regions of high unemployment, so that regional labour realloca-
tions occur, is not strong. Unemployed individuals in a depressed area do
not seem to have either higher actual or higher intended migration rates (and
the evidence points to lower actual migration rates). The only link that has
been established using individual data between unemployment levels and
migration is that unemployed white collar workers are more likely to intend
to migrate. (We are currently investigating the relationship between unem-
ployment and actual migration rates). Thus, an economy with two regions
which are identical except for their unemployment rates may experience a
small net inflow of white collar labour into the low unemployment rate
region, as a consequence of higher gross flows from the high unemployment
region. Detailed evidence is not yet available concerning whether depressed
regions experience lower inflows, which would certainly offer the possibility of
providing a more balanced means of regional adjustment including manual
workers. For this reason the consequence of high regional unemployment for
the level and nature of U.K. regional inflows, must be considered a priority
research topic.
We feel obliged to end these remarks with a note of caution. In view of the
evidence that only white collar workers migrate from depressed areas it is
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prompted by unemployment, it would help restore to equal prosperity the
various regional labour markets. For example, consider a model in which the
regional demand for labour is influenced by the entrepreneurial quality of its
local labour force. Now suppose that entrepreneurship is more likely to
develop amongst more able workers. If more able workers tend to be white-
collar workers, whom we know to be most likely to migrate, then the
adjustment process may involve a higher outflow of potential entrepreneurs!
employers, the 'seed-corn' of future businesses providing the demand for
labour, than of future employees. It is more usual in regional analyses to
assume that the location of. a firm's owner is irrelevant to the location of
capital, but this may be inappropriate for small businesses and thus most of
the high-growth businesses.
4.3. The level and the regional distribution of the NAIRU
In section 2 we discussed how the housing system influences geographic
mobility, and in sections 4.1. and 4.2. how the system may also affect the
nature of adjustment to shocks to the level or composition of demand or
supply. Now we consider other arguments concerning the effect of housing
policies on the distribution of unemployment and labour shortages in the
U.K.perhaps because they cause unemployment to accumulate in areas
with a high density of council housing - and on individual incentives to be
unemployed. The origins of these arguments were various pieces of evidence
concerning high unemployment amongst council tenants. We shall briefly
consider the arguments and then interpretthedirect evidence linking
unemployment and tenancy.
Towns and regions with a high density of council housing are likely to
experience an excess of tenants seeking to migrate out of the area over those
trying to enter it. This inhibits the migration of council tenants, who will not
wish to give up their location-specific housing subsidy. In contrast, the major
subsidy to house purchasers is not location-specific and thus it does not
frustrate migration. Over time there will be a tendency for areas with more
council housing - and thus with more location-specific subsidies- to retain a
larger labour stock than those with less council housing. (The argument is
similar to the wage-compensating principle used by Hall (1972) where all
workers in an area receive the location-specific subsidy.) While the pattern of
council house construction may in this way change the spatial allocation of
the labour force, it will only affect unemployment if wages are not locally
flexible.
Alternatively, there are various reasons why, apart from considerations
arising from geographic immobility, unemployment may systematically differ
between house tenure groups. For example, the replacement-ratio for social
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owners - with and without mortgages - are treated under the social security
system. An argument we would emphasize concerns the role of wealth in
labour supply decisions. A large proportion of the typical U.K. household's
wealth is invested in housing - either in the form of an equity stake or in
terms of the present value of a dependable rental subsidy. A tenant in good
accommodation might well consider himself more wealthy than certain
owner-occupiers with a small amount of realizable capital after allowing for
house selling costs. Unfortunately, the U.K. data sets do not allow a direct
investigation of how far wealth affects the length of job search but it seems
possible that this factor may directly influence the relationship between house
tenure and unemployment. Council tenants may also differ in unemployment
behaviour in so far as they are a self-selected group with certain unobserved
characteristicsthatinfluencevariousaspectsof behaviourincluding
unemployment.
What evidence relates house tenure and unemployment? In work based on
a sample of manual workers from the1973-74 GHSMcCormick(1983)
found that there was a strong correlation between tenure and the probability
of being unemployed. After controlling for other observable characteristics
and for regional unemployment he found that council tenants are about3
times more likely to be unemployed than are owner-occupiers. We have re-
examined this relationship using data from the1983 LFSand again find a
very strong link between unemployment and tenure with the ratio of the
adjusted unemployment rates for council tenants and owner-occupiers being
even larger than ten years earlier. In view of the arguments that council
tenants are self selected and that unemployment may reflect inherent ability,
it is interesting that the model can be applied to skilled manual workers on
their own with the same outcome. Similarly, the finding cannot be explained
by higher job turnover amongst tenants: job turnover is only40%higher
among tenants than among owner-occupiers.
The argument that something other than self-selection is at work suggests
that areas with more council housing will have higher unemployment- this
cannot be true with self-selection unless the additional assumption is invoked
that some towns have more workers with the unobserved unemployment-
inducing personal characteristics. Again, models of the unemployment rate in
large towns in England and Wales, controlling for socio-economic compo-
sition and demand shocks, show that the proportion of controlled rental
housing (council and private) has a strong positive effecton local unemploy-
ment rates though less than in individual data. (This cannot be readily
explained by the argument that council housing was constructed in areas
that at the time of construction were depressed: heavy building in the
Midlands and North West, and relatively little in Wales are the counter-
examples - see McCormick(1983)for further details.)
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tenancy to inhibit migration may explain why certain regions experience
labour shortages and others unemployment, we doubt for two reasons that
this accounts for the higher unemployment rates of tenants found in
individual data, both before and after controlling for socio-economic charac-
teristics, unobserved heterogeneity, and regional unemployment. First, the
parameters on the various tenure categories in a model of unemployment
probabilities always indicate identical behaviour for tenants of private and
council controlled housing, and yet only council housing reduces migration.
Second, since it is never possible to reject the hypothesis that owners without
mortgages have similar unemployment probabilities to the controlled rental
groups, the most appropriate distinction is between owner-occupiers with
mortgages and the rest. This leads us tentatively to favour the view that the
wealth/incentive package for mortgages may substantially affect unemploy-
ment patterns in addition to the usual socio-economic and demand variables.
Thus, if council housing can be assumed to have replaced private rental
accommodation that was squeezed out by rent controls, we would argue that
the individual equilibrium, and therefore the NAIRU rate of aggregate
unemployment, may not have been substantially affected. At the same time, it
seems entirely plausible that the pattern of relatively high unemployment
rates in the depressed regions of the U.K. combined with persistent labour
shortages in southern England has been aggravated by a council housing
system which significantly limits the ability of manual workers to relocate
from thesitesof declining traditional industries in the north towards
southern areas.
5. Policy response
There are two levels on which policy might be developed. In our view the
appropriate response is not to attempt to patch up the existing system by
implementing ad hoc reforms focused upon the issue of mobility but to
consider the broader framework of taxation, housing finance and rent control
legislation. The nature of housing finance leads to excessive investment in
owner-occupied housing which involves high transaction costs and low
mobility for individuals who could be expected to prefer good quality rental
accommodation were there incentives to make it available. Again, a coherent
policy determining localauthorityrents, building levels and migration
arrangements, thereby providing our largest nationalized industry with a
framework respecting overall national needs and not local interests would be
especially advantageous. Finally, a policy of gradually removing rent controls
would be especially beneficial for young mobile workers.
On a more ad hoc level there are just two points we would make
regarding the management of council housing in the present framework.
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of new lettipgs available to migrants at no less than a certain minimal level.
Local authorities acting individually do not have the appropriate incentives
to choose this variable at a socially optimal level. Second, we favour the
establishment of a central unit to coordinate the location of new council
housing, for at any given level of council house building local incentives in
both the North and the South are likely to lead to the share of new council
house construction occurring in southern England to be below the optimal
level.
More generally it seems that job-related migration is low in the U.K.- at
least by comparison with the U.S. though not perhaps by comparison with
other countries in Northern Europe - even after we have adjusted for the
major effects of tenure and education. If migration is seen as an important
means of encouraging greater labour market flexibility, then the government
will probably need to take action to reduce the costs of migration borne by
the individual. Much job-related migration is sponsored in the sense that it
arises because firms transfer workers from one part of the country to another
- either as a succession of career moves or as a result of the relocation of
office or production facilities. For the U.S. Bartel reports that such migration
represents approximately one-third of all migration by workers, whereas the
share of sponsored migration is much higher in the U.K.- in the 1973-74
and 1983 surveys about 60% of workers who had migrated in the past year
and were employed a year ago were still working for the same employer. In
these cases the costs of migration are usually defrayed by the firm and are
tax-deductible in computing the firm's tax liability and- so long as any
expenses paid are 'reasonable' - are not taxed in the hands of the migrant.
On the other hand public sector employers and many firms are unwilling
to meet the full relocation costs of new employees. In the U.S. such un-
reimbursedexpenses,whichareessentiallyan investmentyieldinga
higher employment income flow, may be tax-deductible under the personal
income tax code, whereas they are not inthe U.K. A change in this
direction deserves serious consideration. The reluctance of the tax authorities
to create further tax expenditures - even small ones in a worthy cause- may
rule out action in this direction.
The present system seems to bear hardest on manual workers. In part this
is because regional wage differences are surprisingly small in money terms,
and for owner-occupiers real wages are highest in areas of high unemploy-
ment where house prices are low. Thus, either an increase in regional wage
differentials will be required to stimulate greater migration or a reduction in
regional differentials in housing costs (both rents and house prices). Regional
wage differentials seem to be much larger in the U.S. than in the U.K., which
goes some way to explaining the difference in migration rates between the
two countries. However, this is clearly not a complete explanation as we
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differences in local movement rates, especially job-related movement, by
manual workers, which cannot plausibly be ascribed to the influence of
differential wage rates. The regional pattern of wages seems to have been
remarkably stable despite major changes in the composition and level of
unemployment, so it is clear that there is very strong institutional inertia
resisting the realignment of local wage rates in response to the pressure of
demand in local labour markets.
Whatever happens to regional wage differentials, any attempt to increase
geographic labour mobility in the U.K. must involve a much higher rate of
new housebuilding suitable for manual workers in low unemployment areas
- particularly in the South East. This runs directly counter to the interests of
existing residents of these areas who are benefitting from the capital gains
resulting from the limited supply of housing and who also object to new
building on the grounds that it will reduce the environmental benefit which
they currently enjoy. Such conflicts over zoning have, of course, been a
feature of Californian growth but in Britain they are given a special twist by
the existence of strong planning controls combined with 'greenbelts'
designed to stop urban sprawl in the immediate post-war period but which
are now tending to strangle residential development in much of southern
England. in essence U.S. zoning controls tend to be local in character
whereas British ones have a much wider regional impact.
Finally, we should note thatin a varietyof measures theBritish
government has attempted to encourage migration on a limited scale and
there are even schemes which provide subsidies to migrating workers. The
money available for such schemes is small and, in general, there seems to be
little public or government support for migration as a remedy for regional
unemployment differentials.
Overall, our conclusions concerning the contribution of geographic labour
mobility to achieving a greater degree of flexibility in the labour market are
not optimistic. The empirical work discussed above provides convincing
evidence that the council housing system represents a substantial barrier to
job-related local movement as well as to migration. However, even if this
barrier to geographic mobility was suddenly removed so that council tenants
were able to move as easily as other tenants or owner-occupiers, there would
still be very large differences between U.S. and British rates of job-related
migration/movement. Focusing specifically on manual workers, who are most
severely affected by the operation of the council housing system, the removal
of all tenure constraints on geographic mobility would increase job-related
migration and movement rates by less than 75%. American rates of job-
related migration and movement for manual workers are over 10 times as
large as comparable British rates, so that much more than a change in
tenure arrangements would be required to closethisgap. Sinceitis
unemployment ratesfor manual workers which display large regionalM.N. Baily, Comments on the Hughes and McCormick paper 109
disparities, there seems little prospect that these will be significantly reduced
as a result of geographic labour mobility in the absence of major social and
institutional changes affecting both the incentive for and willingness of
households to migrate/move for job-related reasons. Nonetheless, thereare
strong equity and efficiency arguments for removing artificial barriers to
geographic mobility by manual workers, so that reforms in housing policy
which contribute to this goal are clearly desirable.
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COMMENTS
'Housing Markets, Unemployment and Labour Market Flexibility
in the UK' by G. Hughes and B. McCormick
Martin N. BAILY
Gordon Hughes and Barry McCormick have writtena first-rate paper
exploring the extent to which public housing (council housing) in the United
Kingdom is a barrier to migration, and hence an obstacle to labor market
adjustment. They draw on their own prior work and presentsome new
results to make a convincing case that council housing does discourage
migration, but that the elimination of this mobility barrier would not help
much in reducing overall unemployment.110 M.N. Baily, Comments on the Hughes and McCormick paper
The authors begin with a comparison of migration and movement in the
United States and the United Kingdom. Migration in the United Kingdom
means a move across a regional boundary, while in the United States it is
across a state boundary. Movement means any address change. The validity
of their migration comparison can be questioned, because states and regions
are different concepts. Moving across a state line can be as large as from
New York to California or as trivial as from the New York suburbs of New
York City to the New Jersey suburbs of the same city. Many migration
studies of the United States try to track in more detail the nature of the
move - how far, or whether it was rural to urban, and so on.
Despite this reservation, the relatively high propensity of Americans to
both move and migrate comes through clearly in the data. Even if Britons
had the same pattern of house tenure and education as Americans, they
would move less. Most Americans are immigrants or have recent ancestors
who arc immigrants, so a high propensity to move is hardly surprising.
Now that Europe is facing severe long-term unemployment, the flexibility
of the U.S. labor market looks attractive. But it was only a few years ago
that economists were explaining why unemployment in the United States was
so much higher than in Europe. The high turnover rate in the United States
was often cited as a cause of high frictional unemployment and a high
NAIRU. This may show that labor market institutions or patterns that work
badly in one situation may work well in another. At the least it should make
us hesitate to advocate social engineering.
The bulk of the HughesMcCormick paper explores the evidence for the
impact of council housing on migration. And the case is overwhelming.
Council house tenants make up nearly a third of United Kingdom house-
holds and most of these households are headed by manual workers. They do
move often from one council house to another in the same locality, so they
are not just families that stay put. However, they very rarely leave a locality.
Of the 3658 household heads in the 1973 survey, only 7 changed regions in a
year, and 5 of these had lived in London.
The main question about results such as these, of course, is whether
council house tenancy is a proxy for some unobserved characteristics of the
individuals. Do people who want to stay put choose council housing? To
some extent this must be true. If all the council housing were suddenly sold
to the private sector and market rents levied on tenants, it is doubtful if the
tenants would immediately migrate at the rate predicted by the authors'
equations. But the impact would certainly be substantial. Moreover, in one
respect their results understate the impact of council hpusing because many
of those now living in private rental accommodation are on waiting lists for
council housing, and may be just as reluctant to move as existing tenants.'
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Given that council housing reduces migration, does that make ita
significant barrier to equilibrating job mobility? The authors look at reasons
for migration and at the impact of unemployment on it. The results are very
discouraging for anyone hoping to use housing policy to aid the labor
market. Blue-collar workers do not seem to respond to differences in job
opportunities as reflected in unemployment rate differences. When a region
becomes depressed, the professional and white-collar workers do migrate out.
But the blue-collar workers remain behind, living in council housing and
being supported by unemployment compensation and other family members.
The power of mobility to equilibratethelabor market inBritainis
apparently very limited.
The authors raise an interesting implication of their findings about low
mobility. Labor unions are stronger and more militantinthe United
Kingdom than in the United States. That fits, because U.S. workers are more
likely to vote with their feet by moving, whereas U.K. workers do not see
migration as an option and use group action in the form of a union.
Strategic end-game wage bargaining is probably more common in the United
Kingdom than in the United States.
The final issues remain: what should be done about housing policy in
Britain and, indeed, what should be done about unemçloyment? It is clear
that current housing policy in Britain is not optimal. It inhibits migration,
for whatever reason, and is not an efficient form of income redistribution.
The program to sell off council housing is apparently not working and, in
any case, drastic policy changes would create upheaval. A gradual move to
raise rents towards market-clearing levels seems indicated, combined with
specific steps to open up council housing to in-migrants, as the authors
suggest. It should be noted, however, that describing a fully efficient housing
market is not easy. When a region becomes depressed, this imposes large
capital losses on the owners of housing capital and infrastructure capital,
whether these owners are in the private sector or public sector. A high level
of migration by workers does not necessarily indicate an efficient market.
Flexible regional wage rates that encourage new business investment to
replace the plants that have closed may be more efficient. Unfortunately,
such flexibility is apparently less in Britain than in the United States, exactly
the opposite of what one would expect from the low U.K. migration rate.
The blue-collar work-force in Britain has suffered for over five years from
a massive shortfall of jobs and the solution to this problem is one of
doubtful feasibility. It is to combine forceful expansionary macroeconomic
policies with limits on union power and a reorientation of the tax and
transfer system to provide greater rewards to work. Housing policy is
probably not a big player in this story.112 TInoki, Comments on the Hughes and McCormick paper
COMMENTS
'Housing Markets, Unemployment and Labour Market Flexibility
in the UK' by G. Hughes and B. McCormick
Takenori INOKI
This paper provides convincing evidence that the council housing system in
U.K. significantly limits job-related local house movement as well as labor
migration. Since itis asserted in conventional economic theory that labor
mobility that shifts human resources between geographic areas is of central
importance to the efficient operation of labor market, the problem dealt with
in this paper is highly relevant to the analysis of economic adjustment,
particularly when we are concerned with the actual contents and cause of
unemployment in relation to the concept of NAIRU. The points argued as
well as statistical techniques employed in this paper are quite solid, and their
limitations and qualifications are carefully noted. So the paper is basically
self-contained and is not vulnerable to substantial criticism.
My first comment concerns the method to evaluate labor market 'flexi-
bility' adopted by Hughes and McCormick. Job mobility and migration are
usually consideredto be afavorable indicatortodetecttheefficient
operation of labor market, but the other side of the coin of mobile labor is
high labor turnover which generally tends to reduce the workers' skill and
productivity due to the change of their specific work place. Indeed Freeman's
'voice-exit hypothesis' focuses on such an aspect of 'exit' solution which
increases recruitment and training costs of job movers and their loss of skill
in the workshop. It will be interesting to know to what extent Freeman's
conclusion that unions have positive effects on productivity turns out to be
valid in U.K.'s industrial scene. The welfare implication of labor immo-
bility may be a little more complex than is assumed in this paper.
Secondly, the link between employment levels and migration that was
established in this paper by using individual data is that unemployed white
collar workers are more likely to intend to migrate across regions. If, as the
authors put it, more educated workers tend to be white-collar workers, we
need some theory which explains the differencein migration behavior
between the more educated and the less educated. One possible theory is
given by Schwartz (1976) which was tested to be valid for the case of Japan
(Inoki and Suruga (1981)),i.e.,the more educated are found to be less
deterred by an increase in distance. (Smaller distance elasticities of migration
are observed for more educated persons.) In the U.K. case which was
examined by Hughes and McCormick, it also seems that the fixity of blueT Inoki, Comments on the Hughes and McCormick paper 113
collar workers due to the public housing system makes a contrast to the
relatively (compared to the U.S. case) high migration rate of non-manual
workers.
Finally, I would like to add one technical point concerning simultaneity or
endogeneity of migration decision and house tenure choice. Since I haveno
good alternative to correct the bias, my comment will be brief and only
touches on the point related to my second comment. If it is the labor market,
and not the housing market, which imposes the constraints upon household
decisions about migration, the reason why the area of search of manual
workers tends to be narrower (hence less manual workerscross regions)
should be explored more thoroughly. I surmise that herewe will have to
partly rely upon human capital theory and upon the concept of skill-
specificity.
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